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How do we design and deploy crowdsourced prediction platforms for real-world applications where risk is an
important dimension of prediction performance? To answer this question, we conducted a large onlineWisdom
of the Crowd study where participants predicted the prices of real financial assets (e.g. S&P 500). We observe
a Pareto frontier between accuracy of prediction and risk, and find that this trade-off is mediated by social
learning i.e. as social learning is increasingly leveraged, it leads to lower accuracy but also lower risk. We also
observe that social learning leads to superior accuracy during one of our rounds that occurred during the high
market uncertainty of the Brexit vote. Our results have implications for the design of crowdsourced prediction
platforms: for example, they suggest that the performance of the crowd should be more comprehensively
characterized by using both accuracy and risk (as is standard in financial and statistical forecasting), in contrast
to prior work where risk of prediction has been overlooked.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourced prediction systems through approaches such as the Wisdom of the Crowd [37, 43]
or Prediction Markets [6, 49] have been successful in a range of domains such as predicting the
reproducibility of scientific research [30], estimating the caloric content of food items [10], and
predicting stock market prices [92].
From the perspective of platform designers who want to deploy such prediction systems at scale
for real-life applications, one under-studied aspect of the performance of the crowd is the risk
of the prediction of the crowd: over a collection of separate prediction tasks, it is important to
measure the variance of the average accuracy — in addition to the average accuracy of the crowd in
predicting the realized outcome correctly — as it provides a measure of the risk of the crowdsourced
prediction system. This is because the crowd might be accurate on average (over these separate
prediction tasks) but have a high variance in accuracy across tasks (i.e. for some prediction tasks,
the accuracy might be quite poor), making it risky to employ this system for prediction. This view
is standard in statistical [28, 40, 56] and financial [41, 58, 85] forecasting applications, but it not
commonly studied in the literature on the Wisdom of Crowds and many adjacent areas of collective
intelligence research.
To demonstrate the importance of measuring risk in Wisdom of Crowds platforms, we deployed a
large crowdsourced prediction task in which wemeasure the accuracy and variance of the prediction
system over 7 independent rounds of predicting financial asset prices (S&P 500, gold and WTI Oil).
1.1 Contributions
• We observe a Pareto frontier [38, 83] between accuracy and risk: as the average accuracy of
the crowd over the different prediction rounds increases, so does the variance in the crowd’s
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predictive accuracy. We further observe that this trade-off is mediated by the amount of
social learning—i.e., the extent to which users pay attention to each other’s judgments.
• We deployed one of our prediction tasks just before the Brexit vote during which there was
a great deal of market uncertainty [93], and we observe that during such uncertain times
social learning leads to higher accuracy.
• While modeling the belief update process of participants using Bayesian Models of Cognition
[46, 47] to estimate their amount of social learning, we observe that our participants exhibit
the attribute substitution heuristic of human decision-making [59], whereby a complicated
problem is solved by approximating it with a simpler, less accurate model. We also observe
people’s preference to learn from social information rather than from non-social information.
• We are releasing our large dataset1 which is the first dataset, to the authors’ knowledge, that
records not only participants pre- and post-exposure predictions, but also both the social and
non-social information they were exposed to in a large-scale social Wisdom of the Crowd
domain.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW)
In the present work we study how platform design mediates collective intelligence in the context
of a Wisdom of the Crowd task. The study of collective intelligence—the ability of groups to come
together to solve problems collectively—has long been a key area of research in computer-supported
cooperative work (CSCW). Within the CSCW community, the interest in this area of research has
centered on how to improve collaborative work through the lens of collective intelligence research.
Building on early work of Malone, Grosz, and colleagues [48, 81], CSCW researchers have studied
factors that influence collective intelligence [64], platforms for promoting collective intelligence
[4, 24, 82], frameworks for understanding collective intelligence [45], and phenomena of collective
intelligence in digital settings (e.g., [55, 109]).
More recently, a new strand of work has looked into how to deliver high-quality results for
complex real-world applications: for example a system inspired by distributed computing infras-
tructures has allowed crowds to work with thousands of workers and tasks by accounting for
human factors [27], a hybrid system can overcome the issue of initial low-fidelity data [39], and
new approaches has been presented that allow crowds to build datasets that approximate complex
machine learning data distributions dynamically [17].
Similarly, we believe that in order to deploy Wisdom of the Crowd systems at scale — for
example, as in our task, the prediction of financial asset prices — their performance must be more
comprehensively characterized.
2.2 Wisdom of the Crowd
One popular domain within the collective intelligence literature is the Wisdom of the Crowd
[37, 43], where participants (typically referred to as the ‘crowd’) are asked to make predictions of a
certain quantity, such as the future price of an asset on the stock market [92] or the caloric content
of food items [10]. It has been found that the central tendency of the crowd (such as the average,
the median, or other aggregates) – used as a measure of collective belief – can be quite accurate
[37, 43], where accuracy is defined as the error between the crowd’s aggregate prediction and the
“ground truth” (here, the realized future price of the asset).
There is a rich literature aiming to optimize the accuracy of the crowd, such as by recalibrating
predictions against systematic biases of individuals [107], selecting participants who are resistant
1Data and code are available here.
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to social influence [78], rewiring the network topology of information-sharing between subjects
[2, 10], and optimally allocating tasks to individuals [61].
Overall, it has been hypothesized that crowds can be highly accurate in aggregate because
people’s individual biases are typically not correlated [92], and, therefore, cancel out on average.
However, when participants in the crowd start sharing information, such as through social learning,
their beliefs can become correlated and therefore degrades the accuracy of the crowd. In the next
section, we discuss the impact of social learning on accuracy.
2.3 Social Learning
One of the promising avenues for advancement in the CSCW field from the science of collective
intelligence is the effect of social learning—the use of information about other people’s decisions to
make one’s own — on the collective performance of crowdsourcing systems such as the Wisdom of
the Crowd.
Several threads of research in CSCW and adjacent areas examine the importance of social
recommendation on engagement with web content (e.g., [13, 71, 72, 106]). From a design perspective,
the relationship between social observation and collective intelligence is especially interesting
because crowdsourcing platforms can often be optimized to be more social [16, 73], even though
research on collective prediction problems is divided on the effect of social learning on collective
performance.
On one hand, prior work has shown that exposure to social information can lead to degraded
performance in aggregate guesses [75, 87, 107]: increasing the strength of social influence has been
shown to increase inequality [101], selecting the predictions of people who are resistant to social
influence has been shown to have improved collective accuracy [78], the influence of influential
peers has been theoretically shown to prevent the group from converging on the true estimate
[107], and exposure to the confidence levels of others has been shown to influence people to change
their predictions for the worse [86].
On the other hand, social learning has also been shown to lead to groups outperforming their
best individuals when they work separately [2], a collective intelligence factor has been shown
to predict team performance better than the maximum intelligence of members of the team [115],
and human-inspired social communication between agents has been shown to improve collective
performance in optimization algorithms [1, 70].
Therefore, the role of social learning in collective performance is still being understood, but the
question of how social learning impacts collective intelligence has great potential to impact our
understanding of platform and interface design in CSCW settings.
2.4 Risk
The prior workmentioned above in both the social learning and theWisdom of the Crowd literatures
have focused on maximizing the average accuracy of groups with little regard to the variance (risk)
of the predictions. It has been proven theoretically [28, 56] and observed in a variety of statistical
applications [36, 40] that there is a fundamental trade-off between accuracy and risk. This means
that, for any prediction system, risk will be ever-present and that maximizing accuracy will lead to
increasing risks, i.e. the performance of the system will always exist within a pre-defined Pareto
frontier [38, 83].
In practice, treating risk and accuracy as equally important for prediction is standard in statistical
[28, 40, 56] and financial [41, 58, 85] forecasting applications and literature because it allows system
designers to carefully calibrate their strategies to risk — for example to hedge for probable losses
[7, 14, 15, 22, 104]. Furthermore, in a meta-study of 105 forecasting papers, 102 of them support
prioritizing for lower risk [5].
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Fig. 1. An annotated screenshot of how data was collected: the pre-exposure prediction Bpre is shown
first, followed by the social histogram BH and the price history BT . Finally, the updated prediction Bpost is
collected. The ground truth of the asset’s final closing price will be V (not shown here, realized at the end of
the round).
At the individual level, there is strong evidence that people preferentially optimize for risk
instead of accuracy in a variety of domains [54]: cognitively, people have been observed to manifest
decision heuristics [60] to be conservative in the face of uncertainty [51, 116]. For example, rice
farmers have been observed not to adopt significant harvest improvement technology because of
the risk of it failing once and causing significant family ruin [11]. Evolutionarily, risk aversion has
been shown to emerge when rare events have a large impact on individual fitness [51]. Theoretically,
when considering more realistic decision-making scenarios, such as repeated trials (as opposed to
one-time bets), it has been shown that accounting for risk is critical to understanding the dynamics
of how people make decisions [96].
Given the importance of risk both at the individual level and as an important metric in a range of
forecasting applications, it is important to study it within the context of crowdsourced prediction
platforms.
3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The main goal of our study is to investigate if risk is an important dimension of crowdsourced
prediction platforms that is required to fully characterize the performance of the crowd, and
whether social learning affects risk. To do so, we hypothesize that a Pareto frontier exists between
risk and accuracy — i.e. that there is a trade-off between risk and accuracy of prediction across
several prediction rounds — and that social leaning impacts this trade-off.
To test this hypothesis, we need a dataset with the following requirements:
• Predictions made of complex and difficult to predict phenomena so that our results are
applicable to the real-world platform applications being studied within the CSCW community.
• A standard against which we can compare our dataset to judge its external validity.
• A large number of predictions for statistical significance, with both pre- and post-exposure
predictions collected.
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• The exact social and non-social information each user was exposed to after their initial pre-
exposure prediction so that we can later model how different types of information influenced
them in updating their belief into their post-exposure prediction.
• Predictions over many separate independent prediction rounds.
• At least one prediction round that occurred during a period of high uncertainty to understand
if our findings change in abnormal settings.
Given the above requirements, we designed the experimental procedure detailed below: we
recruited a total of 2,037 participants over seven prediction rounds to predict the future prices
of financial assets (the S&P 500, WTI Oil, and gold prices) during seven separate consecutive
3-week rounds over the span of 6 months, resulting in 9,268 predictions (i.e. 4,634 prediction
pairs/sets). We focused on predicting financial prices as doing so is a hard prediction problem
[12, 33]. Our participants were mid-career financial professionals with years of financial experience.
Our participants consented to their data being used in this study and we obtained prior IRB approval.
3.1 Data Collection
As shown in the screenshot of the user interface in Fig. 1, we designed the data collection process
as follows: every time a user makes a prediction of an asset’s future price through our platform,
the following prediction set comprising Bpre ,BH ,BT and Bpost is collected:
• A “pre-exposure” belief prediction Bpre , which is independent of any social information. For
example, a user might show-up on the platform and predict that the closing price of the S&P
500 to be $2,001 on June 24th , 2016.
• The predictions BH within the social information histogram shown to each user after each
initial prediction. Additionally, we display a 6-month time-series of the asset’s price BT up to
this point.
• The revised “post-exposure” prediction Bpost . For example, after seeing the social histogram
and asset price history, a user might update their belief to $2,201. Since the real price (the
ground truth V ) ended up being $2,037.41, this user became more accurate after information
exposure (they went from $2,001 to $2,201).
We ensure that the “pre-exposure” prediction is made before any social information is shown.
We present a unique histogram for every new prediction (as it is built using past predictions up to
this point), as well as a unique price history time series (as it shows the 6-month price data up to
the time of prediction). We require all participants to make a post-exposure prediction.
During each round, participants made a prediction of the same asset’s closing price for the same
final day of the round. We use the round’s last day’s closing market price as our measure of ground
truth. We carefully instrumented the social and non-social information that our participants were
exposed to, and collected their predictions before and after exposure to this information. We also
deployed one of our rounds during a high uncertainty period to understand if variance reduction
strategies allows the crowd to be resistant to risk.
Whenever we predict a final closing price, we only use user prediction data up to the week before
the day of prediction (i.e., we don’t use any data during the last week of the round) so that our
predictions are not too easy. One of our rounds of prediction happened to end the day of the Brexit
vote, which means that we have prediction data during a particularly volatile market period [93].
We chose the start and end dates of each round so that the expiry dates of the asset’s underlying
futures would not affect the price of both the asset and its futures. Financial data (asset and futures
prices) is obtained through Barchart.com’s API.
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3.2 External Validity of Data Collected
As shown in Table 1, our participants are collectively quite accurate — in agreement with past
Wisdom of the Crowd studies [43, 92] — indicating that their predictions are being thoughtfully
elicited: we observe that the crowd is generally doing more than just linear extrapolation (we test a
model where we simply extrapolate prices in time using a static slope) as the error of such a model
is higher. Additionally, we observe that the crowd’s mean prediction error2 is much less than the
overall price change of the asset for the 3-week prediction period.
Interestingly, the crowd’s collective prediction over each round tracks (and sometimes outper-
forms) the futures of each asset being predicted (we calculate the futures error as the difference
between the futures price and the asset price). Because futures prices are commonly used a measure
of the global market’s prediction of the price asset [3, 35], the fact that the crowd’s performance is
on-par with the futures prices indicates that our dataset is externally valid.
Prediction Round
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Asset SP500 WTI Oil Gold SP500 SP500 SP500 SP500
Grounth Truth ($) 2037.41 45.95 1335.80 2153.74 2126.41 2191.95 2262.53
Num. Prediction Sets 284 207 134 1174 925 1441 469
Price Change (%) 4.01 11.03 3.63 1.77 1.75 2.24 3.56
Linear Extrapolation Error (%) 6.66 16.4 1.26 1.62 2.75 0.75 3.10
Crowd Mean Error (%) 2.22 4.95 0.46 0.84 0.58 3.20 2.40
Futures Mean Error (%) 2.03 3.05 0.94 0.38 0.40 0.48 1.50
Table 1. Summary of data collected. Our crowd is accurate, and sometimes even outperforms the futures
underlying the asset. Predictions made by participants are more accurate than simple linear extrapolation.
3.3 Brexit Data
We deployed one of our experiments right before the Brexit vote during which there was a lot
of market uncertainty [93]: the prediction round starting on June 1st 2016 ended on June 24th
2016, the day of the Brexit vote, and participants were predicting the price of the S&P 500, an asset
sensitive to global events [20, 26]. We collected 284 prediction sets during the first 2 weeks of the
round, and 52 sets in the last week during which the global financial market first overestimated
then underestimated the final price of the S&P 500 asset leading to a 3.7% crash, as shown in the
candlestick plot in Fig. 2.
4 METHODS
Our hypothesis is that a Pareto frontier exists between risk and accuracy — i.e. that there is a
trade-off between risk and accuracy of prediction across several prediction rounds — and that social
learning impacts this trade-off.
In order to test this hypothesis, we need to select subsets of predictions based on howmuch social
learning impacted the way these predictions were made. We can then calculate the risk and accuracy
of these subsets and study the impact of social learning on these two aspects of performance. Given
that participants were exposed to both social and non-social learning, we cannot directly separate
predictions based on whether they were updated through social learning or not. We therefore need
a way to estimate how much social learning was used by participants for each prediction, and then
a way to select subsets of prediction based on their amount of social learning. Using these subsets,
2Higher relative errors in round 2 are an artifact of the fact that a few dollars’ error on the lower price of WTI Oil seems
like a higher error compared to same absolute error on the higher prices of the other assets (about $45 per share for WTI
Oil compared to $2100 for the S&P 500 and $1300 for gold prices).
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Fig. 2. The close, low, and high price of the asset and its underlying futures are shown as candlestick plots.
The asset and futures overestimated the price and then crashed during the last week.
we then want to measure how much social learning impacted accuracy in this subset compared to
the full set of predictions (namely, the Wisdom of the Crowd) - we calculate not just the accuracy
of a subset but its improvement relative to the original Wisdom of the Crowd (average of the full
set of predictions).
From the perspective of platform designers who want to be able to select predictions based on
required levels of accuracy or risk (e.g. to fit a certain portfolio of risk), it is important to measure
improvement of subsets relative to the full collection of predictions. This is because, currently,
platform designers only have access to one global measure of risk and accuracy — that of the
whole set of predictions (when there is no subset filtering). To demonstrate that selecting subsets of
predictions can lead to significant improvements in accuracy and risk, we therefore need to calculate
these improvements.
For our results to support our hypothesis, we need to find a statistically significant trade-off
between risk and accuracy over subsets with varying amounts of social learning.
The structure of this section is as follows:
• In section 4.1, we describe howwemodel individual belief update — how a participant updates
their prediction from their pre- to post-exposure prediction — using either numerical Monte
Carlo methods or approximate methods based on prior work by [46, 47].
• In section 4.2, we detail how we evaluate the error (residual) between the modeled updated
belief and the actual updated belief of a participants. This error will allow us to introduce
a parameter which allows us to estimate the relative amount of social learning for each
prediction set. Creating such parameters is standard in the Wisdom of the Crowd literature.
[63, 105].
• In section 4.3, we describe ourmethodology for subsetting predictions based on their estimated
amount of social learning. Subsetting predictions based on estimated quantities is common
[78].
• In section 4.4, we explain how the accuracy and risk of subsets are measured, and how they
are used to create a Pareto curve [83].
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4.1 Modeling Belief Updates
Using formalism inspired by Bayesian models of cognition [46], we can model the 4,634 prediction
sets collected over many rounds, at a high level, as a Bayesian update. To use this formalism, we
need to select a prior distribution for each individual’s belief, a likelihood (evidence) distribution,
and a way to use them to compute the posterior (updated belief) distribution. Here, we describe
modeling at a high level, and describe more thoroughly our two modeling approaches in the next
sections.
As we are interested in how individuals update their belief regarding the asset’s future price
(ground truth)V based on the information we expose them to, the choice of the prior distribution is
straightforward: Ppr ior (V ) ≈ P(Bpre ), the distribution over an individual’s pre-exposure belief of V .
There are two main likelihood (evidence) distributions participants employ: the assets’ price history
BT participants are shown, giving us Pl ikel ihood (V ) ≈ P(BT ), or analogously, the social histogram
BH , giving us Pl ikel ihood (V ) ≈ P(BH ).
Given the prior and likelihood, the modeled posterior prediction Pposter ior (V ), can, therefore,
be approximated as Pposter ior (V ) ∝ P(BH ) · P(Bpre ) in the case of the social histogram, and
Pposter ior (V ) ∝ P(BT ) · P(Bpre ) when participants learn from the past price history. When using
the social histogram, we can simply bin the prices shown to a participant and obtain a distribution
over prices. When using price history BT , the time-series of prices needs to first be transformed
into a ‘rates’ histogram as is standard in financial technical analysis [88, 94]. To do so, the daily
rate in price change is calculated, and this histogram of price change per day is used to extrapolate
and predict asset prices. Specifically, a daily rate, rt , of asset price change is calculated for each day
during the 6-month interval that a user is shown, rt = Bt−Bt−1Bt . These rates are then used to create
a histogram of prices similar to when using the social histogram.
We do not make any other assumptions in terms of what data to use to approximate the likelihood
and prior distributions. Given these distributions, the question is then how to compute the posterior
(updated) belief of an individual.
Although the space of possible distributions and posterior computation approaches is very large,
we focus here on using two simple, interpretable, and theoretically-motivated approaches from prior
work [47], namely using Gaussian (normal) distributions to approximate priors and likelihoods,
and using a Monte Carlo numerical sampling approach to calculate the posterior from the actual
distributions of prices that participants were exposed to. We leave to future work the exploration
of richer distributions and approaches to modeling belief update as it is beyond the scope of this
study.
4.1.1 Approximate Approach: In this approach, we assume both the prior and likelihood to be
normally distributed such that the modeled posterior — which models the belief update of an
individual and therefore allows us to predict their belief after exposure to information — is
also normally distributed. When using the social histogram BT as evidence, the posterior is
Pposter ior (V ) = (Bpre + BH )/2. We call this model GaussianSocial3w. When modeling belief
update from the price history BT we obtain GaussianPrice, where Pposter ior (V ) = (Bpre + BT )/2.
We include the derivation of these models in the supplementary.
4.1.2 Numerical Approach: Instead of using an approximated distribution for the likelihood, follow-
ing the formalism of [47], we can use a numerical approach by binning the likelihood distributions
to estimate the posterior distribution using Monte Carlo methods. Because we do not have access to
the distribution of the prior belief of each individual (as we only have an individual point estimate
for each prediction set), we still have to approximate the prior. We model the prior to be Gaussian,
3We can sum the scalar Bpre to the average of BT , BT , as the average is also a scalar.
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with the mean set as the pre-exposure prediction of an individual, Bpre , and the standard deviation
set as the standard deviation of the social histogram BH or the standard deviation of the price
history BT , depending on which likelihood distribution was used.
Specifically, we calculate the posterior distribution Pposter ior (b) of an individual’s post-exposure
prediction b in the following way: let bj be a unique value in BH, and PBH (bh) be the probability
density of bh in BH. Let Ppr ior (b) be the density of b in the parametrized prior distribution. The
posterior distribution for the numerical model is defined as Pposter ior (b) = PBH (b)×Ppr ior (b)∑
bj ∈BH PBH (bj )×Ppr ior (bj )
when using the social information BH . After computing this posterior distribution using rejection
sampling [42] — our data and distribution are small enough that rejection sampling was fast enough
—, we use the mean of the distribution as the modeled updated belief of a participant.
4.2 Evaluating Model Error
For all models, we compute the relative residual error between themodel’s prediction of the posterior
(µ∼Pposter ior (V )) and the actual post-exposure prediction (Bpost ) as: (µ∼Pposter ior (V )−Bpost )/Bpost . For
the approximate approach, µ∼Pposter ior (V ) is simply the mean of the normal distribution representing
the posterior, while in the numerical approach, the mean is estimated through averaging over all
bins of the empirical distribution (the distribution is small enough that sampling was not needed).
For all models, the 95% confidence intervals are calculated as follows: we assume the data follows
Student’s t-distribution since the variance of the true distribution is unknown and, therefore, we
estimate it from the sample data. Let se be the estimated standard error of the sample mean and te be
the t-value for the 95% confidence interval desired, which can be computed via inverse t-distribution.
The lower and upper limits for the 95% confidence interval are [µe − tese , µe + tese ], where µe is
the estimated sample mean.
4.3 Subsetting Predictions
Using these models, we can estimate which information source — social information or price history
— each participant used to update their belief by comparing the residual errors of models using
either social information or price history as likelihood. This will allow us to select subsets of
prediction based on whether they were more likely updated using social or non-social information.
Our approach is illustrated in Fig. 3. This approach of estimating characteristics of how predictions
are revised is standard in theWisdom of the Crowd literature. For example, prior work has estimated
resistance to social influence [78] and influenceability in revising judgements after seeing the
opinion of others [63, 105], and used them to improve collective performance.
Although we explored many models of belief update (as detailed in Result section 5.3), we
choose to focus on the GaussianSocial and GaussianPrice models (which assume the prior and
likelihood to be Gaussian) due to their superior modeling accuracy, and because they are simple,
interpretable, and theoretically-motivated models from prior work [47]. We leave for future work
the interesting question of searching the large space of parametric and non-parametric models and
distributions to best predict people’s belief update process.
Therefore, using GaussianSocial and GaussianPrice, we calculate a residual ϵH for when
learning from social information BH and a residual ϵT when learning from the price history BT ,
as ϵH =
|GaussianSocial−Bpost |
Bpost
and ϵT =
|GaussianPrice−Bpost |
Bpost
respectively. We define α = ϵT − ϵH ,
and we use it to measure how likely a participant used each source of information to update their
prediction. For example, for a prediction set [Bpre ,BH ,BT ,Bpost ] if α > 0 (i.e., ϵT > ϵH ), this means
that this prediction set is better modeled using the social histogram of peer’s belief BH instead of
the price history BT .
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Fig. 3. An example belief update: for each prediction set, a user updates their belief from the pre-exposure
prediction Bpre to the updated prediction Bpost by either learning from the social histogram BH and/or
the price history BT . ϵH is the residual between the modeled updated prediction GaussianSocial and
the participant’s updated prediction Bpost ; ϵT is the residual between GaussianPrice and Bpost . α is the
difference between ϵT and ϵH .
Using α , which we re-scale to be in the interval [-1,1] for each round, we can select a subset
Sαs of the prediction sets such that the α of these prediction sets lie in the range 0 ≤ α < αs (or
αs < α ≤ 0 when αs < 0), where αs is the one-sided boundary we will vary in order to measure
how much more likely a participant updated their belief from the social information instead of the
price history. For example, the higher αs is, the more likely a prediction set is better modeled using
the social histogram of peer’s belief BH instead of the price history BT .
4.4 Evaluating Improvement of Subsets
Each prediction set is now associated with a measure of the relative amount of social vs non-social
learning, the parameter α . To subset predictions based on α , we bin the α ’s from all 4,634 prediction
sets into 15 groups of equal size, and compute the improvement in prediction error of each subset
Sαs and its variance compared to when all the crowd’s predictions are used (i.e. compared to the
Wisdom of the Crowd). To select a subset Sαs of the prediction sets, we select them based on
whether their the α of these prediction sets lie in the range 0 ≤ α < αs (or αs < α ≤ 0when αs < 0).
In order to measure the improvement in accuracy after exposure to information, we select only
the post-exposure (updated) predictions πpostj within the subset of predictions Sαs , calculate the
average prediction of this subset Ej∼Sαs [πpostj ], and then the (absolute) error of this average within
each round i , with respect to the ground truth V , as
|Ej∼Sαs [π
post
j ]−V |
V
Similarly, we then calculate the error of the whole crowd’s post-exposure predictions Sall ,
through the same computation as above, using −1 ≤ α ≤ 1 for the set Sall instead of Sαs . We
define improvement ISαs as the absolute difference between these two errors, as it measures the
improvement in accuracy of using a subset Sαs over using the full set of predictions — the Wisdom
of the Crowd — within Sall . Critically, this will allow us to measure if exposure to varying degrees
of social vs non-social information improves or worsen the performance of the crowd, and is an
important metric for platform designers looking to improve the performance of a crowdsourced
prediction system.
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Note that the improvement defined so far is for each bootstrap b for each round i , and is more
clearly denoted as ISαsi,b . Our reported value of improvement (the one in Fig. 4) is over 100 random
bootstraps with replacement and is thereby calculated as such: over all rounds i , we first calculate
the average improvement, E
i
[ISαsb,i ] for each bootstrap b, and then, over all bootstraps, we calculate
E
b
[E
i
[ISαsb,i ]]. We use boostrapping [31] in order to have a more robust estimate of the average
accuracy and its variance (described in the next section).
In a Pareto curve we are interested in not only measuring the average accuracy described above
but also the risk of the crowd in predicting the wrong collective prediction over the different
rounds. This is because we are interested in estimating the spread of the distribution of accuracy —
risk — of the Wisdom of the Crowd over all prediction rounds. Therefore, in Fig. 4, we first calculate,
for each bootstrap b the standard deviation (our measure of risk) across the seven rounds i of
prediction, i.e.
√
E
i
[(ISαsb,i − Ei [I
Sαs
b,i ])2]. We then compute the average of this risk over 100 bootstraps
and report this value. We use standard deviation instead of variance as it is the more popular
measure of risk in practice [85].
4.5 Summary of Methods
We first model the belief update of individuals after they have been exposed to either the social
information or the price history, using either an approximate approach or a numerical approach.
We observe the residual (error) between the modeled and the real updated belief of a participant
using these various models and find that the GaussianSocial and GaussianPrice models (which
assume the prior and likelihood to be Gaussian) outperform all other models (as detailed in Result
section 5.3). Using these models, we compute a parameter α which allows us to estimate whether
each prediction set was more likely updated using social information or the price history. Using
α , we can select subsets of predictions that were more likely to have been made using one of the
information sources. The accuracy this subset can then be compared to the full set of predictions
(referred to as the Wisdom of the Crowd) to calculate the improvement of this subset. Similarly, we
calculate the variance (risk) of this improvement.
5 RESULTS
5.1 Accuracy-Risk Trade-off
Using a Pareto curve [83], we compare the improvement in prediction accuracy and risk of each
subset Sαs . As shown in the Pareto plot in Fig. 4, we observe that although people who learn more
from price history are more accurate, there is increased variance—and therefore risk—in their
predictions. This suggests that there is a risk-return trade-off between learning from one’s peers
versus looking at the price history: as social learning is increasingly leveraged, it leads to lower
accuracy but also lower risk (replicating prior findings that exposure to social information decreases
the variance of the crowd [75]). Note that the social histogram is quite often non-unimodal (as
detailed in the next result section 5.3), which means that participants are intentionally collapsing
multiple distribution modes to decrease variance.
Such a Pareto trade-off between risk and accuracy is common in financial forecasting [41, 85]
and statistical prediction [28, 36, 40, 56], but has not been typically observed in the literature on
the Wisdom of Crowds. This has implications for the design of crowdsourced prediction platforms
as described in the Discussion section 6.1.
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Fig. 4. In this Pareto curve, we plot the improvement of each subset vs. the standard deviation in improvement
within this subset. We see a risk-return trade-off: predictions made with price history are more accurate, but
with higher risk (standard deviation). Smoothed curved is generated using LOESS [18].
5.2 Performance under High Uncertainty
An additional result of our study is the investigation of the crowd’s performance during high
uncertainty using the data from the prediction round that happened during the Brexit vote. We ran
the analysis described earlier, but only for predictions made during the last week. Note that in all
previous results, we took care not to use the last week of data to calculate collective accuracy so
that prediction was not too easy, but we do so here as the high uncertainty makes prediction quite
hard. This last week of data that we use is a disjoint subset of data from the data we previously
used.
Again, we bin all α ’s from the prediction sets during this week and investigate the improvements
of subsets of predictions compared to the whole crowd. We use a smaller number of bins due to the
smaller number of predictions during the last week: 52 prediction sets in the last week compared
to 284 during the open period of prediction that we previously used for predictions.
As can be seen in Fig. 5, as α decreases (i.e. we select predictions that were more likely updated
using the price history instead of the social information), improvement in accuracy of subsets
compared to the Wisdom of the Crowd (all predictions) severely decays down to -3.14% (95%
confidence interval [2.49, 3.79]). Conversely, as subsets of predictions updated using the social
histogram (αs > 0) are selected, the improvement in their accuracy is fairly stable (although
negative).
Note that although a smaller number of predictions were made during the last week before Brexit
(52 prediction sets compared to 284 during the open period of prediction as discussed earlier), we
have sufficient data to afford statistically significant results as shown by the 95% confidence intervals
of our findings. The improvement values, confidence intervals, and their accompanying αs are
included in Table 4 in the supplementary. Unfortunately, given that such high market uncertainty
only occurred during one round, we do not have enough data to produce a Pareto curve over
multiple rounds.
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Fig. 5. Improvement when selecting predictions based on how much more they were likely made using social
information (αs > 0) vs. price history (αs < 0). 95% Confidence intervals obtained through 100 bootstraps.
When the price history is itself very uncertain, participants who learn from their peers do better than when
they learned from the price history.
Our results suggest that although social learning generally leads to lower accuracy as shown
in the Pareto curve of Fig. 4, during periods of high uncertainly, social learning leads to higher
accuracy. This suggests that social learning could be leveraged by platform designers as a valuable
tool that minimizes catastrophic performance.
5.3 Belief Update Models
Although our goal is not to search for the best model of individual belief update, we highlight our
observations from fitting simple, interpretable, and theoretically-motivated models and distribu-
tions from prior work. It is important to note that GaussianSocial and GaussianPrice are both
parameter-less models and did not require any parameter fitting, making their success in modeling
belief update even more interesting.
As can be seen in Fig. 6, models that use social information for modeling the belief update of partic-
ipants (GaussianSocial,GaussianSocialModes, NumericalSocial) perform better than models
that use the price history (GaussianPrice, NumericalPrice). This suggests that our participants
predominantly use social information instead of the price history to update their belief.
More specifically, GaussianSocial, our simple Gaussian model that assumes the data follows a
single-mode Gaussian distribution, outperforms GaussianSocialModes, a model that measures
when the social histogram is non-unimodal (which we estimate using the Hartigan’s dip test of
unimodality [50]) and uses the largest mode as the mean of the distribution in the same belief
update procedure as GaussianSocial. This suggests that people assume the data they learn from
to be unimodal even when it is non-unimodal, in line with prior work [29, 91].
Additionally, GaussianSocial outperforms themore precise numericalmodel NumericalSocial
which makes no parametric assumption on the data distributions and uses a Monte Carlo proce-
dure to estimate the posterior distribution. This suggests that people use simple heuristics when
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Fig. 6. The y-axis shows the relative residual betweenmodeled belief update and actual updated belief. Simple
approximated models do better at modeling belief update than numerical models, and models using social
histograms as likelihood perform better than models using the price history. Error bars represent 95% CI.
learning from their peers. However, when people are learning from the price history, the domi-
nance of simpler models is not as clear as the performance of the simple GaussianPrice model is
indistinguishable from that of the numerical model (NumericalPrice).
GaussianSocial also outperforms the popular DeGroot model commonly used as a benchmark
in the literature [25], where an individual updates their belief as the weighted average belief of
their peers. Here we set the weights (trust values) equal for all peers, as we have no data to estimate
these weights, and therefore assume a uniform prior. It is interesting to note that GaussianSocial
is equivalent to the DeGrootmodel when a participant’s weight on their own prior belief is equal to
the total of the weights of all other participants. This is in agreement with previous work showing
that people put a disproportionately larger weight on their own prior belief [23, 89].
Overall, the superiority of GaussianSocial in predicting belief update suggests that participants
use a heuristic, uni-modal, and simple belief update procedure when updating their beliefs, and
that they predominantly update their predictions using social information instead of price history.
6 DISCUSSION
Our hypothesis was that a Pareto frontier exists between risk and accuracy — i.e. that there is a
trade-off between risk and accuracy of prediction — and that social learning impacts this trade-off.
Our results support this hypothesis: Fig. 4 demonstrates that a Pareto frontier exists — similarly to
statistical [28, 40, 56] and financial [41, 58, 85] forecasting systems — and that it is mediated by
social learning. Additionally, our belief update models (Fig. 6) suggest that participants rely on
social learning (and other heuristics) to update their belief.
6.1 Design Implications
Currently, crowdsourced prediction systems using a Wisdom of the Crowd approach focus on
measuring and optimizing the average accuracy of their participants with little regard to the
variance (risk) of the predictions. Practically, this means that platform designers and operators
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deploy a task to be predicted (e.g. predicting future prices) and end up with a single measure of
performance for the task - the average accuracy of the crowd (or some similar measure of central
tendency).
Our results suggest that the performance of such systems can be more comprehensively char-
acterized by using both the average accuracy of the crowd and its variance. This is especially
important because crowdsourced systems are being increasingly deployed for applications where
uncertainty and risk can be quite harmful, such as in the medical information discovery domain
[44, 69, 114] where incorrect predictions are extremely costly. More generally, the modeling of risk
supports more powerful and versatile applications of crowdsourced predictions such as hedging
risks over portfolios of tasks which is standard in financial and statistical forecasting.
Additionally, given that the performance of a crowdsourced prediction system lies along a Pareto
frontier, a practical question for designers is how to tune the platform to reach a desired value of
risk and accuracy. Our result that social learning can mediate the accuracy-risk trade-off provides
a practical means to attain performances along this frontier. Practically, our results suggest that
social learning within a crowdsourcing platform could be more purposefully leveraged to fit the
task at hand: for example, platform designers could vary the social learning between users by
incentivizing it to have lower risk — especially during highly uncertain times, as our results from
the Brexit prediction (Fig. 5) round showed.
Additionally our results provide evidence that there exists competing effects of exposure to social
information versus non-social information on both accuracy and risk. Prior work had separately
investigated exposure to social information [75] or to non-social information [53, 95]. By designing
our experimental procedure such that people were freely able to learn from either social or non-
social information and then estimating how much more of each source of information a person
learned from, we are able to show that each type of learning causes opposite effects in terms of
accuracy and risk: learning from the price history encourages higher accuracy, while learning
from one’s peers minimizes risk. This provides direct insights as to the design of crowdsourced
prediction platforms as it indicates that there is an important balance between providing social and
non-social information.
6.2 Heuristics and Biases
Our results also have implications for the literature on decision heuristics and biases [91, 108].
Through the modeling of belief update, we observe that our subjects exhibit the attribute sub-
stitution heuristic of human decision-making [59], whereby a complicated problem is solved by
approximating it with a simpler, less accurate model. We observe this heuristic as our participants
simplify the data they are using to update their belief. This is evidenced by the fact that our
participants’ updated beliefs are better modeled by the GaussianSocial model (which assumes
the data to be unimodal) than by the multi-modal belief update model GaussianSocialModes,
indicating that our participants generally wrongly assume the data to be unimodal even when it
is not (measured using the Hartigan’s dip test of unimodality [50]). This is in line with previous
studies that have shown that people wrongly assume data to be unimodal [29, 74, 90] due to the
fact that using multi-modal data is cognitively costly [52]. Additional evidence of this substitution
heuristic is from the fact that approximate models better predict the updated beliefs of participants
than the more complicated (numerical) models: the GaussianSocial model outperforms the more
precise Monte Carlo numerical models (as shown in Fig. 6).
Another decision heuristic that we observe is that people prefer to use social information rather
than the underlying price history of an asset to update their belief as models which use social in-
formation (GaussianSocial,GaussianSocialModes, NumericalSocial) outperform models that
use price history (GaussianPrice, NumericalPrice) as shown in Fig. 6. However, this collective
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preference for social learning comes at the price of lower accuracy (Fig. 4). It is especially surprising
that our participants preferred to use social information instead of prices to update their belief given
that they were mid-career finance professionals with strong financial experience who should know
that price information is generally better to predict future prices [32, 79]. Such behavior has been
observed in prior work where even experts performing a familiar task demonstrate sub-optimal
decision heuristics [66, 103], and often over-rely on social information [34, 97]. However, instead of
seeing such behavior as irrational, our results suggests that perhaps participants are preferentially
aiming for lower risk instead of higher accuracy. This preference for social information especially
pays off during the high uncertainty period before the Brexit vote.
Therefore, our results support growing evidence that heuristics and biases are not merely defects
of human decision-making, but that perhaps they optimize for richer objectives or are optimized
for more time- or data-constrained decision-making [21, 57, 62, 68, 80, 84, 102]. For example, when
individual decision-making is viewed within the lens of more realistic requirements such as limited
time [8, 19] or attention [110], heuristics and biases—such as people assuming that the environment
around them undergoes strong abrupt changes even when it is quite stable [77, 100]—act as priors
that facilitate fast decision-making [76, 99], and are quite helpful in practice.
6.3 Future Work
Our work demonstrates that crowdsourced prediction platforms behave similarly to financial and
statistical forecasting systems in that they exhibit an accuracy-risk Pareto frontier, and that this
trade-off is mediated by social learning. This observation opens a number of interesting avenues
for future work within the CSCW community. One interesting next step would be to investigate
if different modalities of social communication and learning have have a similar accuracy-risk
trade-off such as different types of discussions on forums [67] or the diversity of backgrounds
of people interacting [111]. In our work, we restricted each round to have a static population of
participants whose predictions were shared: an interesting direction for future work would be
to embed participants in social networks given the importance and popularity of recent work on
the effect of communication topologies [1, 2, 9, 10] on group performance. Another interesting
avenue for future work would be to utilize established metrics of risk aversion [98] and investigate
how subsetting predictions using these metrics affects collective accuracy and risk minimization.
We also leave to future work the exploration of the large space of parametric and non-parametric
models that best model people’s belief update process. All these directions of future work pave the
way for improving the design and deployment of crowdsourced prediction platforms.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
DERIVATION OF GAUSSIAN MODEL
We describe GaussianSocial here. GaussianPrice follows the same derivation, substituting the
social histogram BH with the price history BT .
Our notation follows that of [65]. We assume that people’s estimate of the future price before
information exposure, Bpre , is being sampled from an internal prior distribution [113], and that the
sample we obtain is indicative of the mean of the prior distribution following the results of [112].
We suppose that people think each asset has a true value,V ∗, which people are trying to estimate
to predict the future asset value, V (the ground truth); that prior beliefs about V ∗ follow a Normal
(Gaussian) prior distribution, V ∗ ∼ Normal(µpr ior ,σpr ior ); and that evidence about V ∗ can be
understood as being generated from a Normal distribution, Normal(V ∗,σdata). In this case the
posterior beliefs people have follows a simple form. Letting information content be defined as the
inverse of the Normal distribution’s variance I = 1σ , we have that
µposter ior =
µpr ior · Ipr ior + µdata · Idata
Ipr ior + Idata
. (1)
Additionally, the social histogram is treated as representing the information content of data
about V ∗, then we have:
µposter ior =
Bpre · Ipr ior + BH · Idata
Ipr ior + Idata
. (2)
The GaussianSocial rule therefore can be viewed as reflecting an assumption of a Normal
distribution as a mental model, and assuming private information and social information have the
same information content (Ipr ior = Idata ), which gives:
µposter ior =
Bpre + BH
2 . (3)
PERFORMANCE OVER ALL ROUNDS
Here we report the values of the residual for each round for all models. We can observe that
GaussianSocial does best.
ROUND
MODEL 1(S&P 500)
2
WTI Oil
3
Gold
7
(S&P 500)
8
(S&P 500)
9
(S&P 500)
12
(S&P 500)
GaussianSocial 1.53 (0.19) 3.97 (0.48) 1.08 (0.13) 0.92 (0.04) 0.70 (0.04) 1.51 (0.07) 1.23 (0.13)
GaussianSocialModes 1.94 (0.20) 4.85 (0.54) 1.30 (0.19) 1.24 (0.05) 0.98 (0.04) 1.88 (0.08) 1.64 (0.13)
NumericalSocial 2.01 (0.23) 5.24 (0.61) 1.60 (0.25) 1.52 (0.08) 1.07 (0.06) 2.31 (0.10) 2.31 (0.22)
NumericalPrice 2.25 (0.23) 8.70 (0.87) 2.64 (0.19) 1.57 (0.08) 1.09 (0.06) 2.36 (0.10) 2.75 (0.23)
GaussianPrice 2.46 (0.24) 10.3 (0.92) 2.70 (0.22) 1.59 (0.07) 1.13 (0.06) 2.41 (0.10) 2.72 (0.22)
DeGroot 2.04 (0.22) 5.32 (0.60) 1.52 (0.13) 1.71 (0.07) 1.17 (0.06) 2.51 (0.09) 2.27 (0.21)
Table 2. Values of the residual for each round for all models. Numbers in parentheses show the 95% error.
TABLE OF SUBSETTING
In this section, we report the improvement when selecting a subset of participants.
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αs Improvement (%) 95% CI
-1.0 1.03 0.02
-0.9 0.77 0.05
-0.7 0.33 0.07
-0.6 0.32 0.07
-0.4 0.29 0.07
-0.3 0.34 0.06
-0.1 -0.17 0.02
0.0 -0.48 0.06
0.1 0.56 0.03
0.3 0.38 0.03
0.4 0.32 0.03
0.6 -0.27 0.08
0.7 -0.35 0.06
0.9 -0.67 0.04
1.0 -0.93 0.02
Table 3. Improvements achieved by subsetting predictions via αs for all rounds. Confidence intervals are
calculated through 100 bootstraps.
αs Improvement (%) 95% CI
-1.0 -3.14 0.65
-0.2 -0.61 0.15
0.2 -0.66 0.09
0.6 -1.02 0.07
1.0 -1.03 0.05
Table 4. Improvements achieved by subsetting predictions via αs only for predictions the week before Brexit.
Confidence intervals are calculated through 100 bootstraps.
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αs Improvement (%) Standard Deviation
-1.0 1.03 2.17
-0.9 0.77 1.44
-0.7 0.33 0.90
-0.6 0.32 0.93
-0.4 0.29 0.87
-0.3 0.34 0.78
-0.1 -0.17 0.77
0.0 -0.48 0.62
0.1 0.56 1.18
0.3 0.38 1.21
0.4 0.32 1.51
0.6 -0.27 1.18
0.7 -0.35 0.95
0.9 -0.67 0.70
1.0 -0.93 0.74
Table 5. Improvement and bootstrapped Standard Deviation used in Pareto curve.
